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Calleo: The Inapplicability of the Parol Evidence Rule to the United Nati

NOTE
THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many nations participating in today's ever expansive global economy are seeking to establish uniform systems of law to govern their
cross-border transactions. These nations have recognized that uniform
bodies of law often lead to increased efficiency, in terms of time and

cost, in the arena of international transactions.' This twenty-first century
goal towards unification of the law for transnational commerce can be
traced back at least to the Middle Ages.2 Merchants who traveled from
port to port throughout the civilized world sought to create a uniform set
of guidelines to facilitate their trade businesses The United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG" or

"the Convention")4 is the most recent and significant attempt by a num1. See Anthony S. Winer, The CISG Convention and Thomas Franck'sTheory of Legitimacy, 19 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 1-3 (1998); see also, e.g., Joseph Kahn, World Trade: U.S.India Agreement, N.Y. TasEs, Jan. 11, 2000, at C4 (discussing a recent tariff elimination accord
that will have the effect of opening trade for agricultural products, consumer goods, and textiles
between India and the United States, the world's two largest democracies).
2. See Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpretationof the 1980 Uniform Sales Law, 24 GA. J.
INT'L & COriP. L. 183, 186 (1994); see also, e.g., Helene Cooper, Trading Blocks: Countries Have
Long Sought to Limit Imports. The Results Have Sometimes Been Ugly, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11,
1999, at R50 ("The Byzantine Empire was adept at bestowing special privileges on allies and favored industries. Just as the U.S. signed the North American Free Trade Agreement granting special trade status to Mexico and Canada, so did the Byzantine Empire reach a trade pact with Venice.").
3. See Ferrari, supranote 2, at 186.
4. FinalAct of the United Nations Conference on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of
Goods, U.N. GAOR, 19th Sess., Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.97/18 (1980) reprinted in 19 I.L.M.
668, 671 (1980) [hereinafter CISGI. To procure an up to date bibliography and other information
regarding the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
("CISG" or "Convention"), Pace Law School has established an Internet website that exclusively
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ber of nations, including the United States, to codify private international law in the area of the international sale of goods!

Two circuit courts, the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, have taken a
divergent approach with regard to whether the parol evidence rule, a
United States domestic rule of law, comports with the language interpretation provision, Article 8, of the CISG.6 The Eleventh Circuit, in MCCMarble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino S.p.A., 7

held that the parol evidence rule is inconsistent with and does not apply

to the CISG.8 In contrast, Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export
Corp. v. American Business Center, Inc.,9 an earlier decision from the
Fifth Circuit, held that the parol evidence rule applies to the CISG.'0 A

careful analysis of relevant CISG language, its legislative history, the
CISG's goal to promote facility in international contract law, and the
works of most contemporary commentators support MCC-Marble Ceramic Center's decision that the parol evidence rule cannot be administered as a direct application of Article 8."

To help understand the issues in this Note more comprehensively,
Part II provides a historical account of the CISG and a definition and

application of the parol evidence rule. Part TIT contains an in depth discussion of the MCC-Marble Ceramic Center and Beijing Metals cases.
Finally, Part IV explains why courts of the United States should adopt
the CISG and parol evidence analysis employed in MCC-Marble Ceramic Center and not that of Beijing Metals. In addition, Part IV explores how the careful judicial analysis employed in MCC-Marble Ce-

covers the Convention. See <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu>. In Italy, the Centre for Comparative
and Foreign Law Studies in Rome has recently compiled a collection of CISG related materials.
See <http://.cnr.it/CRDCS>.
5. See James J. Callaghan, U.N. Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of
Goods: Examining the Gap-FillingRole of CISG in Two French Decisions, 14 J.L. & CoM. 183,
183-85 (1995); Larry A. DiMatteo, Resolving International Contract Disputes, DIsP. RESOL. J.,
Nov. 1998, at 75, 77-78. Moreover, the CISG has often been described as having the potential to
serve as a true, modem lex mercatoria,or actual international sales law, for parties that engage in
cross-border transactions. See Rod N. Andreason, Note, MCC-Marble Ceramic Center: The Parol
Evidence Rule and Other Domestic Law Under the Convention on Contractsfor the International
Sale of Goods, 1999 BYU L. REv. 351, 354, 355. The CISG is not based on a particular set of domestic legal principles of any country in the world. See Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditionsin the U.N. Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 23 INT'L
LAW. 443,480-83 (1989).
6. See infra Part III.
7. 144 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1998).
8. See id. at 1389.
9. 993 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1993).
10. Seeid. at1184.
11. See infra Part IV.
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ramic Center may serve as a model for courts in other CISG member
nations interpreting Article 8 and other CISG provisions.

II. HISTORY OF THE CISG AMD THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
A.

The CISG

1. Development of the CISG
The CISG is the culmination of an arduous international effort that
commenced nearly seven decades ago to establish international contract
law principles with respect to the sale of goods. 2 During the 1930s, the

International Institute for the Unification of Private Law ("UNIDROIT'
or "Principles") appointed a select group of European scholars to draft a
uniform set of laws for the sale of international goods. 3 In 1935, the
European group issued a preliminary draft. 4 However, during World
War II, the group suspended its operations and did not resume drafting

international sales contract law until 1951."5 By 1958, the group, representing twenty-one nations, produced two drafts, one focusing on the
international sale of goods, and the other, on a uniform law for the for-

mation of contracts. 6 In 1964, a diplomatic conference met in Hague to
finalize the two agreements. 7
Two conventions resulted from the Hague Conference, the Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Law on
the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. 8 Although the work accomplished at the Hague Conference provided a
significant contribution to the law of international trade, the two conventions did not obtain worldwide support. 9 Many nations felt that because only Western European scholars produced and drafted the con12. See JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORi LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 49 (2d ed. 1991); Michael Kabik, Through the Looking-Glass:
InternationalTrade in the "Wonderland" of the UnitedNations Convention on Contractsfor the
InternationalSale of Goods, 9 INT'LTAX & Bus. LAW. 408,415 (1992).

13. See HONNOLD, supranote 12, at 49 (analyzing the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law ("UNIDROlT" or "Principles")); Kabik, supra note 12, at 415.
14. See HONNOLD, supranote 12, at 49; Kabik, supranote 12, at 415.
15. See Anita C. Esslinger, Chapter 4: Contracting in the Global Marketplace: The UN
Conventions on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods and the Limitation Period in the
InternationalSale of Goods, SE06 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 69, 72 (1999); Winer, supra note 1, at 6.
16. See HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 49-50.

17.
18.
19.
but was

See Esslinger, supranote 15, at 72; Kabik, supranote 12, at 416.
See HONNOLD, supranote 12, at 50.
See id.; see also Esslinger, supra note 15, at 72 ("The UNIDROIT product broke the ice
never widely accepted.").
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ventions, the interests of non-Western European countries were not represented.20
To address the concerns of the other nations, the United Nations

established the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") in 1966.21 UNCITRAL's objective sought "'the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade
...to eliminate legal obstacles to international trade and to ensure an
orderly development of economic activities on a fair and equal basis.""
The Commission appointed fourteen states represented by diverse
members of the legal community to prepare text that would reflect the
demands of the world over, and not just the Western European region.'

In 1978, the fourteen-member group completed its work by combining,
modifying, and revising the two conventions from the Hague Conference. 24 Finally, after approximately fifty years of incredible effort, and

as a mark of its international significance, representatives from sixtytwo nations and eight international organizations finalized and unanimously ratified the CISG.2 '
20. See HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 50, 53; Winer, supranote 1, at 7. The United States did
not actively participate in this drafting process until 1963 when it joined the International Institute
for the Unification of Private Law ("UN'IDROIT"). See Kabik, supra note 12, at 416.
21. See HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 50. United States representatives participated in the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") working group. See Peter Winship, Congress and the 1980 InternationalSales Convention, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
707,710 (1986).
22. Kabik, supra note 12, at 416 (quoting Kazuaki Sono, UNCITRAL and the Vienna Sales
Convention, 18 INT'L LAW. 7,8 (1984)).
23. See HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 54. One international political movement, the New International Economic Order ("NIEO") inspired the making of the CISG. See Winer, supra note 1,
at 10-13. The NIEO, an intellectual movement that began in the 1970s, sought to bring economic
parity between developing and developed nations. See id.at 9, 11. The United Nations officially
endorsed the NIEO. See id. at 9. The United Nations Secretary General noted the CISG's goals of
harmonizing and unifying international trade law and reported that the CISG was consistent with
the NIEO movement. See id. at 12-13. The CISG preamble explicitly refers to the NIBO. See id. at
10. The preamble states in relevant part: 'THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION,
BEARING IN MIND the broad objectives in the resolutions adopted by the sixth special session of
the General Assembly of the United Nations on the establishment of a New International Economic Order .... CISG, preamble. Subsequently, in the early 1980s the Reagan Administration
continued the NIEO goal of achieving world economic parity by encouraging a new round of General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade ("GAIT') negotiations that also sought to minimize the
economic disparity between the wealthier northern industrialized countries and the poorer southern
developing countries. See Lionel Barber, EU-US Trade: Past, Present, and Future, EuR., Nov.
1999, at 27, 28.
24. See HONNOLD, supranote 12, at 54.
25. See 1d.;
Winship, supra note 21, at 708. The Convention was executed in six official
languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish. See Esslinger, supra note 15,
at 73. As of April 30, 2000, the following fifty-seven countries have become signatories to the
Convention: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovania, Bulgaria, Bu-
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In 1988, the United States became the forty-second nation to adopt
the treaty." In accordance with Article l,' the Convention automatically
governs international sales contracts between contracting parties located
in CISG member nations, unless those parties expressly agree to opt out
of the CISG's applicability through private contract.2
2. Article 7: General Uniformity Provision
In light of its international character, the founders of the CISG
drafted a broad uniformity provision, Article 7, for the Convention. Article 7 states:
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its
application and the observance of good faith in international trade.
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with
rundi, Canada, Chile, China (PRC), Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt,
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Kyrgystan,
Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Uganda, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekitsan,
Yugoslavia, and Zambia. See <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu>. The Convention only covers contracts for the sales of goods. It does not goveru other types of contracts that are ancillary to an international sales contract such as "distribution agreements, contracts of carriage and insurance,
letters of credit, and dispute resolution clauses." Peter Winship, Changing Contract Practicesin
Light of the UnitedNations Sales Convention:A Guidefor Practitioners,29 INT'L LAW. 525, 527
(1995).
26. See Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
The United States adopted the CISG as a self-executing treaty with the pre-emptive force of federal law. See Richard E. Speidel, The Revision of UCCArticle 2, Sales in Light of the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 16 Nw J. Ibr'L L. & Bus. 165,
166 (1995). Considering that the United States trade deficit with other nations has been an issue of
growing concern for a number of years, a user-friendiy code governing contracts for the international sale of goods would help United States economic interests. See Joseph Kahn, Trade Deficit
Set Record in November: U.S. Urges Its Partners to Start Spending More, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21,
2000, at Cl. Based on preliminary reports, economists estimate that the trade deficit for 1999 is
expected to be about $267 billion. See id. Similarly, in 1997 United States exports and imports
totaled $688.7 and $899 billion respectively. See Michael M. Weinstein, Limits of Economic Diplomacy: Modest Goals in Push to Bring China Into Trade Group, N.Y. TIues, Apr. 8, 1999, at
Cl; see also Richard W. Stevenson, U.S. Trade Deficit Continues to Balloon, Hitting $19.4 Billion, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1999, at C1 (discussing the negative impact reduced exports have on
the growth rate of the United States economy).
27. Article I states in pertinent part: "(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of
goods between parties whose places of business are in different States: (a) when the States are
Contracting States; or (b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the
law of a Contracting State." CISG, art. 1.
28. See CISG, art. 6; Winer, supra note 1, at 18.
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the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such
principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules

of private international law.29

The founders of the CISG intended to achieve the Convention's uni-

formity goal mentioned in Article 7(1) "by removing artificial impediments to commerce caused by differences in national legal systems that
govern international sales of goods."0 The founders of the Convention

also sought to achieve its uniformity objective by encouraging "the dissemination and use of the international case law (jurisprudence) and
scholarly critique (doctrine) that will" interpret the language of the
Convention." Finally, recognizing the obligation of good faith as the

bedrock of international business norms found in most national legal
systems, the founders of the CISG made sure to include a good faith
provision in Article 7(1) of the CISG.32

To determine if Article 7(2) governs a dispute or transaction, a
court first has to ascertain whether an express term of the CISG can re-

solve the legal dilemma.3 If not, then a court should resolve the dilemma in conformity with the general principles of the CISG, which are

the pursuit of obtaining uniformity and simplicity in contract law. Only
if express terms of the CISG or its general principles do not apply
should a court consider any applicable rules of private contract law,
such as the United States' parol evidence rule.
3. Article 8: Language Interpretation Provision
Article 8 deals with the interpretation of contract language and the
conduct of parties. 34 Article 8 provides:

29. CISG, art. 7.
30. Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 89, 103 (1994); see also Winer, supra note 1, at 1 ("One international legal instrument that could facilitate the internationalization of markets would be the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ....).
31. HoNNoLD,supra note 12, at 60 (emphasis omitted); see also Franco Ferrari, CISG Case
Law: A New Challenge for Interpreters?, 17 J.L. & CoM. 245, 260 (1997) (commenting on the
persuasive import that foreign case law should have for courts that need to interpret CISG language).
32. See DiMatteo, supra note 5, at 76.
33. See CISG, art. 7(2).
34. See FRrnz ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 61 (1992);
HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 162; Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 OHio ST. LJ.265, 287-88 (1984).
Article 8 applies in a wide variety of circumstances: from brief telephone or telex communications
for small purchases to detailed contracts negotiated for larger, more complex transactions. See
HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 163.
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(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent

where the other party knew or could not have been unaware what that
intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made
by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the
understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other
party would have had in the same circumstances.
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all
relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any
practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties."

Article 8 is a crucial provision in the CISG because "most contract disputes turn on questions of [contract] interpretation."3 Due to the imprecision of language and the written word, "[n]o written contract is ever
complete; even the most carefully drafted document rests on volumes of
assumptions that cannot be explicitly expressed."7 To ease the difficult
burden of interpreting contract language, the drafters of the CISG opted
for a broad interpretation provision embodied in Article 8Y
Article 8(1) deals with the subjective intent of the parties,3 9 and
Article 8(2) covers the objective intent of the parties.' However, Arti35. CISG, art. 8
36. Rosett, supranote 34, at 286.
37. Id. at 287; see also Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,
442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968) ("'A word is a symbol of thought but has no arbitrary and fixed
meaning like a symbol of algebra or chemistry .... ') (quoting Pearson v. State Soc. Welfare Bd.,
353 P.2d 33, 39 (Cal. 1960)). The following dialogue between two characters in Luigi Pirandello's
classic novel, Six Charactersin Search of an Author, further examines the communicative problems with language:
We each have within us a whole world of things--each of us a special, inner world.
And how can we ever understand each other, when I understand my words according to
the sense and values in my special world, while you, hearing me, necessarily understand my words with the sense and values that make up your inner world? We think
that we understand each other, but we never really can.
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & WENDY M. RoGovN, CONTRACrS: AN INTtODUCTION TO LAW AND
LAWYERING, PART THREE 463 (1998) (quoting LuiGI PIRANDELLO, Six CHARACTERS IN SEARCH
OF AN AUTHOR AND OTHER PLAYS 19 (1995)).
38. See Rosett, supra note 34, at 287.
39. See CISG, art. 8(1); Rosett, supra note 34, at 287. However, Article 8(1) also contains
"could not have been unaware" objective language. See CISG, art. 8(1).
40. See CISG, art. 8(2); Henry D. Gabriel, A Primer on the United Nations Convention on
the InternationalSale of Goods: From the Perspective of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 IND.
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cle 8(2) explicitly states that a party is only to refer to Article 8(2) if the

subjective intent of a party cannot be determined.4' Thus, the Convention gives primary consideration to a party's subjective intent.42 To help
determine the subjective or objective intent of a party, 43 Article 8(3), the

last provision in Article 8, directs courts to give "due consideration ...
to all relevant circumstances of the case including the [parties'] negotiations."'
B. ParolEvidence Rule
Before discussing the divergent parol evidence approach taken by
the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, a definition of the
4 parol evidence rule
and an explanation of its application is necessary. 1
1. The Parol Evidence Rule Defined
Notwithstanding its name, the parol evidence rule applies indiscriminately to both parol and written evidence.4 6 The rule is a substantive, not an evidentiary, rule of law which seeks to give legal effect to
contracting parties' final, and in certain instances, complete expressions
of their agreement which they have reduced to writing." If the parties
INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 279, 281 (1997).
41. See Gabriel, supra note 40, at 281-82.
42. See id.; Thomas M. Gaa, Foreign Accounts: Marketing Loves Them-Financing and
Collecting is the Problem,N98-DBWB A.B.A. LEGAL EDUC. G-33, G-66 (1998).
43. See John E. Murray, Jr., An Essay on the Formation of Contractsand Related Matters
Under the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 8 J.L. &
COM. 11, 4648 (1988).
44. CISG, art. 8(3).
45. This Note discusses the Farnsworth approach to the parol evidence rule. See E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcrs (3d ed. 1999).
46. See Arthur L. Corbin, The ParolEvidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 603 (1944).
47. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 45, § 7.3, at 431. The parol evidence rule does not apply
to subsequent negotiations. See id. § 7.6, at 449. The parol evidence rule also does not purport to
exclude a certain type of evidence as an untrustworthy or unreliable method of proving a fact. See
id,§ 7.2, at 428 (citing J.WIGMoRE, EviDENCE § 2400 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1981)). Rather, the
rule prevents a litigant from attempting to show "the fact itself-the fact that the terms of the
agreement are other than those in the writing." Id. Judge Birch in MCC-Marble Ceramic Center,
Inc. also mentions that "a federal district court cannot simply apply the parol evidence rule as a
procedural matter-as it might if excluding a particular type of evidence under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, which apply in federal court regardless of the source of the substantive rule of decision." MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384,
1389 (1lth Cir. 1998). However, depending on how the rule is stated, the parol evidence rule may
be viewed as either a substantive or an evidentiary rule of law. See JOHN D. CALAMARi & JOSEPH
M. PERmLo, CoNTRAcrs, § 3.2, at 141 (3d ed. 1987). If a contracting party states the parol evidence rule as an integrated writing that supersedes prior or collateral agreements, the rule is substantive in nature. See id.On the other hand, if the parol evidence rule is stated as a particular
writing that is conclusively presumed to contain the entire agreement and other evidence is inad-
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have no intention of forming partial or complete, final expressions to an

agreement,
the parol evidence rule does not apply to that agreement at
48
all.

An agreement that contains final expressions is deemed to be integrated, and depending on the intention of the contracting parties, an integrated agreement may be deemed either partial or complete. 49 The legal effect of a partial integration prohibits a party from introducing
evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or negotiations that
contradict a term of the writing.50 However, a partial integration does
permit the admission of prior or contemporaneous agreements that are

consisten' with the writing. 2 If the agreement is a complete integration, the parol evidence rule prohibits a party from introducing evidence
of prior agreements or negotiations that are contradictory as well as
consistent with the writing. 5 This is what makes the rule particularly
harsh. "It is one thing to accept that what is written cannot be contradicted. It is quite another to accept that what is written cannot be supplemented even by consistent terms.' 4

Although it has been criticized as being too harsh in its application,
the parol evidence rule does have legitimate goals. 55 One of the rule's

principal purposes, an evidentiary function, is to foster the protection of
missible, then the rule is an evidentiary rule of law. See id The import of this distinction "relates
to whether the parol evidence question can be raised for the first time on appeal." Id. If the rule is
depicted as an evidentiary rule, a failure to object at trial will generally waive any error in the admission of improper evidence. See id
48. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 45, § 7.3, at 431.
49. See id. Black's Law Dictionarydefines "integration" as follows:
1. The process of making whole or combining into one. 2. Contracts. The full expression of the parties' agreement, so that all earlier agreements are superseded, the effect
being that neither party may later contradict or add to the contractual terms....
complete integration.The fact or state of fully expressing the intent of the parties.
partialintegration.The fact or state of not fully expressing the parties' intent, so
that the contract can be changed by the admission of parol (extrinsic) evidence.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 812 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis omitted).
50. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 45, § 7.3, at 431; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 215 (1981); see also U.C.C. § 2-202 (1996) (stating that the writing "may not be contradicted by
evidence of any prior agreement").
51. A writing that is consistent with the original agreement signifies that it would serve to
"explain" or "supplement" the terms of the writing. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 45, § 7.3, at
433.
52. See id at 431; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACrS §§ 210(2), 215,216.
53. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 45, § 7.3, at 431; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 216(1).
54. FARNSWORTH, supra note 45, § 7.3, at 434.
55. See CALAMvAP,I& PEmLo, supra note 47, § 3.2, at 141.
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written contracts against perjured or otherwise unreliable testimony of
oral terms." The parol evidence rule also has a channeling function, by
seeking to exclude prior agreements that have been superseded by a
written agreement under a merger theory." Thus, the rule encourages
parties to put the final expression of their agreement in writing, with the
desired object of securing stability and predictability in business transactions."
2. Application of the Parol Evidence Rule
The parol evidence rule may be applied to the terms of a contract
in two different ways: to prove whether parties intended to form an integrated agreement, and to help interpret the meaning of contractual
terms.
To determine the extent to which the parol evidence rule helps to
prove an integration, a two step approach may be employed. 9 The first
determination is whether an agreement is integrated, which depends on
the parties assenting to a final expression of at least some parts of their
agreement.' This is a particularly difficult assessment to make. A written integrated agreement requires no particular form, and an oral agreement may even be considered integrated for parol evidence purposes.6'
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts ("Restatement") contains the
prevailing view for integration: evidence of prior negotiations is admissible to help prove if the writing is intended as a final expression of its
terms.62
Once a fact finder determines that contracting parties have formed
an integrated agreement, the next question is whether the parties in56. See il However, the rule has often been criticized for having the potential to exclude
truthful evidence as well as perjurious testimony. See id.
57. Black's Law Dictionary defines "merger" in the following manner: "1. The act or an instance of combining or uniting. 2. Contracts.The substitution of a superior form of contract for an
inferior form, as when a written contract supersedes all oral agreements and prior understandings."
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1002 (7th ed. 1999).
58. See CAAMARi &PERiLO, supra note 47, § 3.2, at 137.
59. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 45, § 7.3, at 431.

60. See idt; Corbin, supra note 46, at 612; see also Tow v. Miners Mem'l Ass'n, 305 F.2d
73, 74 (4th Cir. 1962) (discussing the finding of an integration in an agreement that was not even
signed by the contracting parties).
61. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 45, § 7.3, at 432. Even preliminary written proposals exchanged by the parties may be deemed final expressions if they are later assented to whether
orally, in writing, or by other conduct. See id.; see also RESTAThmENT (SECoND) OF CONTRACTs
§ 209 cmt. b (stating that "[a] letter, telegram or other informal document written by one party

may be orally assented to by the other as a final expression of some or all of the terms of their
agreement").
62. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 45, § 7.3, at 432.
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tended the agreement to be partially or completely integrated.6 This
question can be answered in two different ways depending upon
whether the fact finder adheres to the traditional, narrower Williston approach,
or to the modem, liberal Corbin approach to the parol evidence
6

rle.1

Under the classical Williston approach, the primary focus in determining Whether an agreement is a partial or complete integration depends upon an objective examination of the language used in the con-

tract.' If a contract appears on its face to be completely integrated, then
a court shall accept this as presumptive evidence that the contract is a
complete integration. 66 Under the Williston analysis, the only way to
permit terms extrinsic to the agreement into evidence would be if there
is some uncertainty as to the meaning of the words. This approach goes
so far as to allow for the possibility that a contract can be formed without considering the intent of either of the two contracting parties as long

as a court is able to give a plain meaning analysis to the contract. 6 Thus,
if a court deems a contract to be unambiguously written, the court "will
not even admit evidence of what the parties may have thought the
meaning to be. '
However, under the modem Corbin approach to the parol evidence

rule, which most United States courts presently follow,' courts focus
63. See id. § 7.3, at 434-35. The greatest disagreement regarding application of the parol
evidence rule has been with deciding whether an agreement was intended to be a complete and
final expression by the contracting parties. See id.
Due to the rule's inherent complexity and awkwardness, courts have not been able to develop a uniform method to apply the parol evidence rule.
See Corbin, supra note 46, at 630-31. As a result, courts in the United States have taken many different approaches to help resolve its problem. See FARNswoRTH, supranote 45, § 7.3, at 434-35.
64. See Corbin, supranote 46, at 630-31.
65. See 4 SAmuEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACrS

§ 633,

at 1014-15

(Walter H. E. Jaeger ed., 3rd ed. 1961).
66. See id.
67. See CALAAIA & PERE1LO, supra note 47, § 3.2, at 148; 1 WILLISTON, supra note 65,

§ 95, at 349-50.
68. 1 WnusToN, supranote 65, § 95, at 350.
69. See Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern ParolEvidence Rule and Its Impli-

cationsfor New Textualist Statutory Interpretation,87 GEO. L.J. 195, 206 (1998). However, the
Williston approach to extrinsic evidence for contract interpretation has recently been resurrected in
the legal community under the New Textualist movement. See id.
at 207. The New Textualist
movement, of which Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia is a principal advocate, deals with
statutory interpretation and seeks to exclude from judicial consideration extrinsic evidence of legislative intent. See id.
at 195. This movement advances the belief that judges should only give
words in a statute a meaning that would be attached to their ordinary, everyday meaning. See id.
Like the Williston theory of contract interpretation, the New Textualist movement has been criticized for overstating the inherent clarity of a word's "plain meaning." See id at 208. For an in
depth discussion of the plain meaning rule, see Eric S. Lasky, Note, PerplexingProblems with
Plain Meaning, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 891, 891-98 (1999).
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more on the intention of the parties, as opposed to their integration
practices." In seeking to ascertain the parties' intent, courts shall take

all circumstances into account, including the evidence of prior negotiations." The rationale behind this approach is that "the completeness and
exclusivity of the writing cannot be determined except in the light of

[all the] circumstances"' 2 in which the parties formed their contract?2
The Corbin approach recognizes that to resolve the issue of whether a

contract is a complete or partial integration is an arduous task.74 "The
writing cannot prove its own completeness and accuracy."" Therefore,
under the Corbin analysis, courts will give wide latitude in determining
whether contracting parties intended their contract to be a complete or

partial integration.76
The Restatement has adopted the Corbin approach to the parol evidence rule and states that determining whether a writing is integrated
should be proven by any relevant evidence. 7 The Restatement also rec-

ognizes that the "writing cannot of itself prove its own completeness,
and wide latitude must be allowed for inquiry into circumstances bearing on the intention of the parties."78 However, even under the more liberal Corbin approach, once a court concludes the terms of an agreement
are partially or completely integrated, then the parol evidence rule applies to that agreement
and will bar the admission of terms inconsistent
79
with the writing.
The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), section 2-202, has also
adopted the Corbin approach to parol evidenceW However, the UCC and
70. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 45, § 7.3, at 435.
71. See Silver Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 611 P.2d 1011, 1020 (Idaho 1979);
CALAMARI & PERMILo, supra note 47, § 3.4, at 149.
72. FARNSWORTH, supranote 45, § 7.3, at 435.
73. See Corbin, supra note 46, at 603-04.
74. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 45, § 7.3, at 435; Corbin, supra note 46, at 630-38.
75. Corbin, supra note 46, at 630.
76. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 45, § 7.3, at 435.
77. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 (1981).
78. Il § 210 cmt. b.
79. See id. §§ 209, 210.
80. See Ross & Tranen, supranote 69, at 205. U.C.C § 2-202 provides:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which
are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their
agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted
by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may
be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to
have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
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Restatement approaches to parol evidence vary in at least one important
way. Unlike the Restatement, the UCC rejects the presumption that a
writing is completely integrated if the parties to a contract deem some
of their terms as final expressions of their agreement.8" Therefore, with
the absence of this presumption, the UCC approach is less deferential to
the written terms of the contracting parties than the Restatement approach.
Besides permitting the admission of evidence to determine whether
an agreement is a partial or complete integration, the Corbin approach
also permits the admission of prior or contemporaneous agreements or
negotiations into evidence to interpret the meaning of contract languageu-i.e., when the contract language is vague or ambiguous.83 In
this case, a court also has the liberty to look to all the relevant circumstances surrounding the transaction.' This includes "all writings, oral
statements, and other conduct by which the parties manifested their assent, together with any prior negotiations between them and any applicable course of dealing, course of performance, or usage."' However, as
with integration, even under the Corbin view, "evidence of prior negotiations might be excluded if it contradict[s] the language in question"

agreement.
U.C.C. § 2-202 (1996).
81. See U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. l(a). Comment 1 emphasizes that "[t]his section definitely rejects: ...[any assumption that because a writing has been worked out which is final on some
matters, it is to be taken as including all the matters agreed upon .... Id. Compare U.C.C. § 2202 with RFSTATE ENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRAcrs § 209(3). The Restatement explains that
"[w]here the parties reduce an agreement to a writing which in view of its completeness and
specificity reasonably appears to be a complete agreement, it is taken to be an integrated agreement unless it is established by other evidence that the writing did not constitute a final expres-

sion."

RE TATENMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS

§ 209(3).

82. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 47, § 3.12, at 176; FARNSWORTH,supra note 45,
§ 7.12, at 476-77. "Interpretation is the process by which a court ascertains the meaning that it will
give to the language used by the parties in determining the legal effect of the contract." Id. § 7.7,
at 452. However, with use of the contemporary parol evidence rule, courts have experienced a
great deal of confusion in determining when "interpretative" statements end and when
"contradictory" or "additional" statements begin. See id. § 7.12, at 480. For example, Farnsworth
states that if a contract is awkwardly drafted, this does not necessarily mean a court will allow a
party to admit extrinsic evidence to help clarify the meaning of the contract's words. See id. Some
courts have attempted to solve this problem by saying that interpretations relate to the meaning of
contract language, such as problems of ambiguity and vagueness, and do not relate to problems
with inaccurate or incomplete contract language. See iU
83. See, e.g., Hokama v. Relinc Corp., 559 P.2d 279, 283 (Haw. 1977) (holding that "all
evidence outside of the writing ...[shall] be considered by the court if there is any doubt or controversy as to the meaning of the language embodying" the bargain of the parties).
84. See FARNSWvORTH, supranote 45, § 7.10, at 467.
85. Id. § 7.10, at 467.
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when using the parol evidence rule for interpretation.86 Moreover, if a
fact finder determines a contract to be a complete integration, not even
additional, consistent terms may be admitted into evidence."
In the following Part, the factual and legal analyses employed in
the MCC-Marble Ceramic Center and Beijing Metals cases illustrate
differing views over the applicability of the parol evidence rule to the
CISG.
III.

THE DIVERGENT APPROACH OVER APPLICATION OF THE PAROL

EVIDENCE RULE TO THE

CISG

A. MCC-Marble Ceramic Center,Inc. v.
CeramicaNuova D'Agostino, S.p.A. s
In MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, the plaintiff company, a United
States purchaser, contracted with the defendant company, an Italian
manufacturer of ceramic tiles for the purchase of tiles. 9 The two parties
memorialized their agreement by using a standard, pre-printed order
form provided by the seller.' ° Some time thereafter, the buyer claimed
the defendant sent tile shipments that were of a lesser quality than what
was bargained for.9' As a result, the buyer sued for breach of contract.2
The seller counterclaimed and sought damages for nonpayment of
past deliveries.93 Further, because the plaintiff did not send a written
complaint in compliance with the contract language to the defendant,
the defendant also argued that the plaintiff lost its right to complain
about the alleged receipt of the lower quality ceramic tile.' 4 The plaintiff
countered that, as per its mutual oral agreement with the defendant, it
86. Id. § 7.12, at 477 n.10 (emphasis omitted); see also Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1139 (Ariz. 1993) (holding that "even under the Corbin view, the court can
admit evidence for interpretation but must stop short of contradiction"). But see Mark L.
Movsesian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains"?The Failureof the Contract Analogy in
Statutory Interpretation,76 N.C. L. REv. 1145, 1162 (1998) ("Under contemporary principles,
where extrinsic evidence shows that the parties shared an intent at odds with the objective meaning
of the written agreement, their intent, not the writing, prevails.").
87. See FARNSWORTH, supranote 45, § 7.12, at 480.
88. 144F.3d 1384 (l1th Cir. 1998).
89. See id. at 1385.
90. See id. On the reverse side of the form, there was a provision stating that if the buyer had
any problems with the quality of the goods delivered, the buyer had to submit a written complaint
within ten days of receipt of the merchandise. See id. at 1386.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 1385.
93. See id. at 1386.
94. See id.
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was not bound to the terms on the reverse side of the form. 5 The plaintiff had three affidavits, one from a MCC-Marble Ceramic Center employee and two from Ceramica employees, that substantiated its claim.'
At trial, the district court held that the contract was a complete integration, and, pursuant to the parol evidence rule, did not admit the affidavits into evidence because they would have contradicted the terms
of the written agreement. 9 The court reasoned that because the plaintiff
failed to make a complaint in accordance with the terms of the contract,
in writing, and within ten days, the plaintiff did not raise any triable issue of material fact.9" As a result, the district court granted summary
judgment for the defendant. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court's decision.'o After engaging in a two part analysis, the Eleventh
Circuit held that, because the parol evidence rule did not apply to contracts governed by the CISG, the plaintiff should have been permitted to
admit the affidavits into evidence to contradict the terms of the written
agreement."0 ' The court principally based its reasoning on Article 8 of
the CISG.'O2 In accordance with Article 8(1), the court stated that
"[c]ontrary to what is familiar practice in United States courts, the CISG
appears to permit a substantial inquiry into the parties' subjective intent,
even if the parties did not engage in any objectively ascertainable means
of registering this intent."'0 3 Thus, a plain reading of Article 8(1) required an inquiry into a contracting party's subjective intent, as long as
one party was "aware!' of the other party's subjective intent." The court
determined that the affidavits the plaintiff wished to admit into evidence
were exactly the type of evidence intended to be covered by Article 8(1).' 05 The plaintiffs affidavit, given by a company representative,
discussed its subjective intent to avoid being bound by the reverse side
of the agreement.' The defendant's affidavits, given by two company
representatives, acknowledged the plaintiff's subjective intent not to be
95. See id.
96. See id.

97. See id. at 1391.
98. See id. at 1388.

99. See id. at 1386.
100. See id. at 1393.
101. See id. at 1392. The court held for the plaintiff, notwithstanding the fact that the form
contract appeared on its face to be a complete integration. See id. at 1386.
102. See CISG, art. 8.
103. MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1387.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 1388.
106. See id.
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bound by the terms on the reverse side of the agreement. 1° Therefore,

according to the court, based on Article 8(1), the affidavits should have
been admitted into evidence. m°

The court next held that, in light of the Convention's desire to
consider the subjective intent of the parties, the CISG rejected the parol
evidence rule.1 °" First, the court based its reasoning on the fact that the

CISG contained no express parol evidence or statute of frauds provision, and, pursuant to Article 11, explicitly provided for the enforcement of oral contracts."0 Second, in accordance with Article 8(3), giving
"due consideration ...to all relevant circumstances"' mandated admitting the plaintiff's affidavits, even if they contradicted the terms of
the contract, "to the extent they reveal[ed] the parties' subjective in-

tent.""..2 The court also noted, in conformance with the Convention's
goal of establishing uniform principles of law to govern international
sales contracts," 3 "[c]ourts applying the CISG [could not] ... upset the
parties' reliance on the Convention by substituting familiar principles of
domestic law [e.g., the parol evidence rule] when the Convention requires a different result.""'
To support its rejection of the parol evidence rule, the court further

reasoned that a party could not avoid the terms of a contract by simply
submitting evidence showing the lack of subjective intent to be bound
by certain written contract terms." 5 Consequently, the affidavits evidencing the plaintiff's and defendant's subjective intents did not represent conclusive proof of the contracting parties' intentions."6 However,

the party opposing the admission of the affidavits had to prove its in107. See id.
108. See id. at 1389.
109. See id. at 1392.
110. See id. at 1399; CISG, art. 11. Compare the CISG with the UCC, which contains both a
parol evidence rule (U.C.C. § 2-202) and a statute of frauds provision (U.C.C. § 2-201). However,
the UCC does permit parties to use oral agreements, but only in limited circumstances where the
oral agreements do not exceed $500.00. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1996).
111. CISGart.8(3).
112. MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1389.
113. See id. at 1390; CISG, art. 7.
114. MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1391; see George P. Schultz, Letter of
Submittalfrom the Presidentof the United States to United States Senate (1983), reprinted in 22
LL.M. 1369, 1369 (1983).
115. See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1391; see also Klopfenstein v. Pargeter, 597 F.2d 150, 152 (9th Cir. 1979) (affmning summary judgment against appellant despite
his submitting an affidavit detailing his subjective intent not to be bound by the writing. The court
held "[u]ndiselosed, subjective intentions are immaterial in ...commercial transaction[s], especially when contradicted by objective conduct.").
116. See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1391.
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admissibility at trial, not at the summary judgment stage." 7 Furthermore, the court reasoned that if the parties wanted to preserve their
written contract, they could have used a merger clause to supersede all

prior oral or written agreements." ' Finally, based on Article 8(3), the
court mentioned that whether or not the plaintiff intended to be bound
by the reverse side of the form contract also depended on the parties'
course of conduct and dealings with each other subsequent to their
written agreement." 9 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the parol evidence rule was inconsistent with Article 8(1) and (3) of the CISG.' 20
Shortly after the MCC-Marble Ceramic Center decision, the
Northern District for Illinois in Mitchell Aircraft Spares, Inc. v. EuropeanAircraft Service, AB12 adopted MCC-Marble Ceramic Center'sparol evidence holding. There, the plaintiff, an Illinois based buyer, sued
the defendant, a Swedish seller of aircraft parts, on a breach of contract
claim for selling the wrong items to the plaintiff. " First, on deciding the
choice of law issue, the Mitchell court held that the CISG governed the
breach of contract claim, but Illinois law governed any contract formation issues. "Next, the court had to determine whether it could consider
parol evidence in trying to resolve the dispute. 4 Finding no case on
point in Illinois or in the Seventh Circuit, the court held that the MCCMarble Ceramic Center opinion from the Eleventh Circuit was highly
persuasive."' The Mitchell court decided that the "CISG requires the

117. See id. In this case, the court indicated that the defendant company was allowed to undermine the credibility of an employee's affidavit. Silingardi, the employee, signed an affidavit
stating his awareness of the plaintiff's subjective intent not to be bound by the reverse side of the
form contract. See id. at 1391 n.20. The defendant wanted to bring forth evidence tending to prove
that at the time of his employment with Cemmica, Silingardi was a disgruntled employee. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 1392.
120. See id. at 1392-93.
121. 23 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. IM.1998).
122. See id. at 916-18.
123. See id. at 918. Sweden and the United States, both party States to the CISG, agreed that
the CISG governed most of the issues in this case. See id. However, when Sweden accepted the
CISG for ratification, Sweden expressly declared that it would not be bound by Part II, the formation of contract section, of the CISG. See id. Nevertheless, Sweden's decision to opt out of Part II
had no bearing on whether Article 8 applied to the case, because that Article is found in Part I of
the CISG. See id. at 920-21.
124. See id. at 920.
125. See id. The court in Mitchell, see id., also relied on Claudia v. Olivieri FootwearLtd.,
No. 96 Civ. 8052(HB)(rHK) 1998 WL 164824, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998), which held that
"contracts governed by the CISG are freed from the limits of the parol evidence rule and there is a
wider spectrum of admissible evidence to consider in construing the terms of the parties' agreement." Claudia,1998 WL 164824, at *5. In Claudia, the court determined that the CISG governed
the dispute between an Italian manufacturer and seller of shoes and an American buyer. See id. at
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court to consider parol evidence inasmuch as that evidence [would be]
probative of the subjective intent of the parties."'2 6 Thus, because the
court determined that the parol evidence rule did not apply, the court
held that it was free to consider any extrinsic evidence concerning the
purchase of aircraft parts.7
B. Beijing Metals & Minerals
Import/Export Corp. v.
American Business Center,Inc.'2
In 1988, the plaintiff, Beijing Metals and Minerals Import/Export
Corporation ("MMB") entered into sales agreements, with the defendant, American Business Center Incorporated ("ABC") for the purchase
of fitness equipment to help develop the weightlifting market in Canada
and the United States.'29 ABC agreed to furnish MMB with design prints
and samples for the research and development of weightlifting products
that MMB was to manufacture for ABC.' According to ABC, from the
outset of their contractual relationship MMB produced and shipped defective goods.' After MMB was notified of the defective goods, MMB
and ABC entered into an oral agreement in which MMB was to send
ABC replacement goods in conformance with the contract specifications."' At that time the parties also orally agreed to change the method
of contract payment to a ninety-day maximum period, in which ABC
was to pay MMB for the equipment.
According to the president of ABC, MMB did not want to reduce
these two oral agreements into written form for political reasons." As a
result, in order to accommodate MMB, ABC agreed not to put the two
oral agreements into writing. 3 ' However, subsequent to their agreement,
ABC only paid for two invoices and declined to pay for approximately
*1, *4. After the American buyer failed to pay the Italian shoe manufacturer for a prior delivery of
shoes, the Italian shoe manufacturer sued the American purchaser on a breach of contract claim.
See id. at *1.
126. MitchellAircraftSpares,Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
127. See id
128. 993 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1993).
129. See id. at 1179-80.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 1180.
132 See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. Unfortunately, the court failed to mention the political reasons that induced Beijing Metals and Minerals Import/Export Corporation ("MMB") not to put the oral terms of the
agreement into written form. See id
135. See id.
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twenty-seven shipments totaling more than $1.2 million.'36 MMB then
notified ABC that if it did not promptly respond with a payment plan,
MMB would no longer ship the fitness equipment to ABC.'37 In response,138the president of ABC negotiated a payment agreement with
MiM.

Notwithstanding their newly formed agreement, ABC alleged that
MMB failed to ship replacement goods to ABC. 39 As a result, ABC
stopped payment on a check it issued to MMB.' MMB then fied suit
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas to
recover the contract amount from ABC. 4' In its defense, ABC maintained that the payment agreement was only part of a larger, more comprehensive agreement, which also comprised the two oral agreements. 42
ABC's defense notwithstanding, the trial court granted summary judgment in MMB's favor, and as a result awarded MMB a money judgment
in the amount of $1.7 million. 43 "The district court held that the parol
evidence rule prevented the two oral agreements [from] being a defense
to ABC's obligations under the written payment agreement."'" The
agreement was written unambiguously and did not point to any evidence
of contingent collateral agreements. 45
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's parol evidence rule holding." Without any explanation
or substantiation, the court determined that the parol evidence rule applied to the case regardless of whether the CISG or Texas state law governed the dispute. 47 The Fifth Circuit then engaged in a two prong
analysis to support its holding. First, the court found that the payment
agreement was a complete agreement.' The agreement was written in
clear language, contained an itemized payment schedule reached by

136. See idU
137. See id.
138. See id. Having acknowledged that American Business Center Incorporated ("ABC")
owed MMB $1.2 million, ABC's president agreed to make the first payment totaling approximately $198,000. See id.
139. See id. at 1185.
140. See id. at 1181.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 1180.
143. Seeid. at1181.
144. Id.
at 1182.
145. See id. In support of its reasoning, the court indicated that the payment agreement contained meaningful consideration and made no mention of replacement goods. See id.
146. Seeid at l184.
147. Seeid. at1182n.9.
148. See id. at 1183.
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unanimous agreement between the two parties, and in no way suggested
the existence of contingent extrinsic agreements regarding the future
shipment of replacement goods.'49 Second, the court held that the two
alleged oral agreements were barred from being admitted into evidence
because they were not collateral agreements' 50 that would have been allowed to be admitted into evidence, provided they were consistent with
the written agreement.' Therefore, the Beijing Metals court allowed the
parol evidence rule to govern the outcome of the case.
IV. THE MCC-MARBLE CERAMIC CENTER PAROL EVIDENCE AND CISG
ANALYSIS: THE CORRECT APPROACH

A.

PlainLanguage of the CISG Comparedto the
ParolEvidence Rule

1. Article 8
A plain meaning analysis of all three provisions of Article 8 suggests that MCC-Marble Ceramic Center adopted the proper approach in
its rejection of the application of the parol evidence rule to the CISG's
interpretation provision. The court in MCC-Marble Ceramic Center
stated that, contrary to common practices under United States statutory
and case law, the CISG allows for "a substantial inquiry into the parties'
subjective intent, even if the parties did not engage in any objectively
ascertainable means of registering this intent."'' 2 The court based this
statement on the fact that Article 8(1) instructs courts to interpret the
conduct of a party "according to his intent where the other party knew
or could not have been unaware what that intent was.' 53
The incorporation of objective language in Article 8(1) and (2) of
the CISG does temper the subjective intent language of Article 8(1).
Besides stating actual awareness, Article 8(1) also includes the language
149. See id.
150. The court defined an agreement as collateral if it was made for a separate consideration,
or was an agreement that "'the parties might naturally make separately and would not ordinarily be
expected to [be] embod[ied] in the writing; and ... not be so clearly connected with the principal
transaction as to be part and parcel thereof."' Id. at 1184 (citing Weinacht v. Phillips Coal Co., 673
S.W.2d 677, 680 (Trex. App. 1984, no writ)).
151. See id. The court found the oral agreement for replacement goods, which included a
$400,000 off-set provision for the loss caused by the delivery of the nonconforming goods, was
not made for a separate consideration and was inconsistent with the integrated contract. See id.
152. MCC-Marble Ceramic Cr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1387.
153. CISG, art. 8(1).
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"could not have been unaware ' 'S' 4 to help establish one party's appreciation of the other party's subjective intent. Likewise, Article 8(2) provides a "reasonable person"' ' standard to aid in ascertaining the meaning of an agreement. However, the language in Article 8(2) explicitly
mentions that the conduct of a party will only "be interpreted according
to the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the
other party would have had in the same circumstances"' 56 if Article 8(1)
does not apply."
The facts in MCC-Marble Ceramic Center can be used as an example to show the nexus between Article 8(1) and (2). The plaintiff had
specific evidence, two affidavits, establishing the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's subjective intent not to be bound by the reverse
side of their pre-printed form contract.' Based on a literal reading of
Article 8(1), the affidavits represent the kind of evidence the CISG allows to be admitted to prove the terms of a contract. 159 Therefore, the
objective language in Article 8(1) and (2) did not apply to the case.
The MCC-Marble Ceramic Center court did acknowledge that only
in rare circumstances, such as in that case, would one party acknowledge the subjective intent of another party's desire not to be bound by
certain terms of an agreement. 16° Rather, in most cases Article 8(2)
would apply, and objective evidence would provide the basis for a
court's decision. 6' Nevertheless, when the CISG governs a case and
CISG language requires a court to first attempt to determine the subjective intent of the contracting parties, courts cannot apply familiar domestic rules, such as the parol evidence rule, to those cases.' 62 Application of the rule would lead to a different result, from a plain meaning
analysis of Article 8.
Article 8(3) directs courts to give "due consideration ... to all
relevant circumstances of the case including the [parties'] negotiations"'63 to determine the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have under the same circumstances.' 64 However, Ar-

154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
See id. art.8(2).
Id.
See id.

158.

See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1385.

159. See id. at 1387.
160. See id. at 1391.
161. See id.; HONNOLD, supranote 12, at 164-65.
162.

See MCC-MarbleCeramic Cr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1390.

163. CISG, art. 8(3).
164. See id.
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ticle 8(3) does not specify the type of negotiations a court may consider.
Thus, under the plain meaning of the language of Article 8, the negotiations can refer to prior, contemporaneous, or subsequent negotiations of
the parties. The lack of specificity of the language used in Article 8(3)
also supports a plain meaning analysis that the negotiations may be either consistent or contradictory to the written agreement. Therefore, Article 8(3) takes an expansive approach to admitting parol evidence.
If the MCC-Marble Ceramic Center court applied the contemporary parol evidence rule, the plaintiff would have been unable to introduce the affidavits-which exhibited his subjective intent not to be
bound to the terms on the reverse side of the agreement-into evidence.'o The evidence the plaintiff sought to admit clearly contradicted
the terms of its written agreement with the defendant.66 Moreover,
whether the court deemed the agreement in dispute to be completely or
partially integrated is irrelevant. The plaintiff still would not have been
permitted to admit the affidavits into evidence because they were contradictory in nature.'6
The Beijing Metals court's determination that the parol evidence
rule applied to the Convention violated the plain language of the Convention. First, the court applied the Restatement presumption that a
writing that appeared to be final on some of its terms constituted a
complete integration.' r" However, no provision in the CISG contains any
basis for making such a presumption l Next, the Beijing Metals court
engaged in another type of parol evidence rule analysis. The court held
that the two oral agreements were not collateral and consistent with the
terms of the original contract, and, therefore, could not be admitted into
evidence. 70 As with the complete integration presumption, Article 8 also
makes no explicit mention of the collateral agreement exception to the
admission of parol evidence, which developed under United States
common-law. 7 '
165. See supra Part III.A.
166. See supraPart I.A. The plaintiff did not wish to be bound by the express terms of the
agreement, which appeared to be a complete integration. See MCC-Marble Ceramic Cr., Inc., 144
F.3d at 1388.
167. The application of the parol evidence rule regarding the interpretation of contract language is irrelevant in MCC-Marble Ceramic Center. The plaintiff did not attempt to admit parol
evidence to establish the meaning of ambiguous or even unambiguous language. Rather, the
plaintiff sought to admit additional evidence that would have contradicted the terms of a complete
integration, the pre-printed form contract. See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1388.
168. See RFsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(3); supraPart 11I.B.

169. See CISG.
170. See supraPart 1DI.B.
171. See Harry M. Flechtner, More U.S. Decisionson the U.N. Sales Convention: Scope, Pa-
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As demonstrated through the facts of MCC-Marble Ceramic Center and Beijing Metals, applying the parol evidence rule to the Convention would unnecessarily encumber Article 8. Application of the parol
evidence rule is not necessary when the plain language of the CISG
leads to a clear resolution to determine the breadth of evidence a court
may wish to admit. 72
2. Article 11
Besides the fact that the CISG does not have an explicit parol evidence rule, Article 11 also supports the notion that the parol evidence
rule does not apply to the CISG. Article 11 states: "A contract of sale
need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to
any other requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses."'' This language suggests that, in addition to having
no explicit parol evidence provision, the founders of the CISG also neglected to provide a statute of frauds requirement where a contract had
to be evidenced by a writing to be considered valid. 74
Allowing contracting parties to form contracts without any particular form demonstrates the importance the CISG places on the subjective
intent of contracting parties. Moreover, Article 11 also allows for the
contract to be proven by any means, including the testimony of witnesses.' Therefore, based on the plain language in Article 11, which is
very general and broad in scope, the plaintiff in MCC-Marble Ceramic
Center, should have been allowed to present the affidavits to the fact
finder to prove if they were part of a more comprehensive agreement
between the parties.

rol Evidence, "Validity" and Reduction of Price Under Article 50, 14 J.L. & COM. 153, 158
(1995).
172. See ALBERT H. KRrrzER, GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 125 (1989).
173. CISG, art. 11.
174. Compare Article 11 of the CISG with the Statute of Frauds requirement in the UCC,
which states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the
price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the
parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a
term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the
quantity of goods shown in such writing.

U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1996).
175. SeeCISG,art. 11.
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A counter-argument to the above mentioned proposal would be
that Article 2 of the UCC, which also applies to contracts involving the
sale of goods, permits application of the parol evidence rule. 76 Thus, as
the parol evidence rule applies to the UCC, it also should apply to the
CISG. However, the UCC contains an explicit parol evidence rule provision, whereas the CISG does not." Moreover, the UCC has a statute
of frauds requirement whereby contracts over five-hundred dollars have
to be evidenced by a writing and in a certain form."' Applying the parol
evidence rule to a code that requires a contract for more than a nominal
amount to be in writing is a logical function of the code's language.
However, applying the parol evidence rule to a code, such as the CISG,
which does not require a contract to be evidenced by a writing, runs
contrary to a literal reading of Article 11, which seeks to uphold contracting parties' agreements, whether in oral or written form.
3. Articles 6, 12, and 96
Articles 6, 12, and 96, when read in conjunction with one another,
further support the notion that the parol evidence rule should not apply
to the CISG. Article 6 provides that the parties who would otherwise be
bound by the CISG "may exclude the application of [the] Convention
or, subject to Article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its
provisions."'7 9 Article 12 states in pertinent part:
Any provision of article 11, article 29 ' or Part Ifa of this Convention
that allows a contract of sale or its modification ... or other indication
of intention to be made in any form other than in writing does not apply where any party has his place of business in a Contracting 82State
which has made a declaration under article 96 of this Convention.

176. See U.C.C. § 2-202.
177. See id.
178. See U.C.C. § 2-201.
179.

CISG, art 6. Article 1 of the CISG sets the parameters for parties that are bound to the

Convention. See CISG, art. 1.
180. Article 29 contains the modification and termination provisions for the CISG. This Article provides:
(1)

A contract may be modified or terminated by the mere agreement of the parties.

(2)

A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring any modification or

termination by agreement to be in writing may not be otherwise modified or terminated

by agreement. However, a party may be precluded by his conduct from asserting such a
provision to the extent that the other party has relied on that conduct.
CISG, art. 29 (footnote added).

181. Beginning with Article 14, Part II contains the formation of contract provisions for the
CISG. See CISG Part II (footnote added).
182. CISG, art. 12.
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Next, in accordance with Articles 12 and 96, a contracting party using
the CISG can make a declaration that "[a]ny provision ...that allows
for a contract of sale ... to be made in any form other than in writing
does not apply where any party has his place of business in a Contracting State."'' 3
Based on the statutory scheme, the Convention allows for contracting parties who wish to reduce their terms only in written form and not
have them be proven by any means, to expressly do so. Similarly, Articles 6, 12, and 96 would also permit the parties to apply the parol evidence rule to the CISG. As long as they make an express declaration4
under Article 96, parties may derogate from provisions of the CISG.'1
However, without making an express "declaration" to the contrary, Article 8-which allows contracts to be oral, in no specific form if written,
and to be proven by any means-does not embrace the parol evidence
rule. Article 11 will automatically govern the contract'
B. Legislative History of the CISG Regarding the
ParolEvidence Rule
A review of excerpts from the Convention's legislative history indicates its founders' intent to explicitly exclude any type of preclusive
evidentiary rule such as the United States' parol evidence rule.' 8
During the seventh meeting of the drafting sessions in 1980, one of
the representatives for Canada proposed the following amendment to
what is currently Article 11:
Between the parties to a contract of sale evidenced by a written document, evidence by witnesses shall be inadmissible for the purposes of
confuting or altering its terms, unless there is primafacie evidence resulting from a written document from the opposing party, from his
evidence or from a fact the existence of which has been clearly demonstrated. However, evidence by witnesses shall be admissible for
purposes of interpreting the written document."

183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. See CISG, art. 6, 12.
185. See CISG, art. 11, 96.
186. Reviewing legislative intent is important because the primary rule for the interpretation
of a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislative body that enacted the statute into law. See
Ross & Tranen, supra note 69, at 208.

187. JOHN 0. HoNotLD,
TIONAL

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFoRM LAW FOR INTERNA-

SALES 662 (1989) (quoting Canada's proposed amendment).
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The Canadian Representative introduced the amendment in order to
place "a limitation on admissible evidence in cases where contracting
parties had freely chosen to have a written contract." ' Thus, unless
supported by additional evidence from a written document produced by
the opposing party or some type of circumstantial evidence, the language of the amendment sought to exclude evidence by witnesses.'89
The Austrian Representative and his delegation opposed the
amendment, because it "was aimed at limiting the free appreciation of
evidence" by the judge.r ° Preventing a judge from reviewing all the
evidence violated a "fundamental principle of Austrian law."'' Similarly, the Representative for Japan opposed the amendment, which he
defined as a mere "restatement of the rule on extrinsic evidence which
prevailed in English-speaking common-law countries."' 92 The Japanese
Delegation refused to accept such a rigid rule that was difficult to apply
and lacked a uniform body of jurisprudence even in the common-law
countries.19 The Japanese Representative further stated that representatives who had participated in previous discussions regarding this Article
had never made a parol evidence rule proposal as proffered by the Canadian delegation." 4
This amendment did not receive wide support from the participating delegations. 9 Upon vote, the Committee rejected the amendment
and sought to adopt Article 11 as written in its current form.' Thus, this
portion of legislative history from the Convention reveals its drafters'
intention and decision to preclude the parol evidence rule, or a similar
type of rule, from the CISG.'"

188. Id. at 491.

189. See id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192.

Id.

193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id. Only one other nation, Iraq, supported the Canadian proposal. Concurring with
the Canadian Representative, the Iraqi Representative commented that the amendment "provid[ed]
a minimum protection with regard to admissibility of evidence." Id.

196. See id.
197. In addition, the UNIDRO1T Principles significantly inspired the founders of the CISG
and are to be read in conjunction with the CISG. See DiMatteo, supra note 5, at 76; Winer, supra
note 1, at 6. The Principles do not contain any parol evidence rule or analogous type provision.
See Joseph M. Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of InternationalCommercial Contracts:The Black
Letter Text and a Review, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 281, 290 (1994); see generally David A. Levy,
Contract Formation Under the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,
UCC, Restatement, and CISG, 30 UCC L.J. 249, 249 (1998) (comparing the UNIDROIT Principles to the UCC, common-law, and the CISG).
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C. The CISG Founders' Intent to Establish
Uniformity in InternationalContractLaw
Application of the parol evidence rule to contracts governed by the
CISG would directly contravene the uniformity objective mentioned in
Article 7(l),19 one of the most significant provisions in the CISG's
"General Provisions" section."'
Not all countries use the parol evidence rule or even have a working knowledge of the rule.2" The parol evidence rule originated at common-law for reasons unique to the common-law system. ' It developed
as a method for common-law judges to control juries who ignored
credible and reliable written evidence of contracts.' In particular, the
United States, more than any other common-law country, has maintained the trial by jury as the standard for both criminal and civil
cases.203 As "[more than ninety per cent of the world's criminal jury
trials, and nearly all of [the world's] civil jury trials, take place in the
Unites States ...it is here that the problem of lay participation in the
judicial process has been posed and discussed most sharply."'
In civil law countries there are no jury trials in civil cases, and they
only occur rarely in criminal cases.f 5 Moreover, in the common-law
system, where the parties' attorneys seek to find the truth through a
process of examination and cross-examination, the judge's role in this
process is passive."' In civil law countries on the other hand, the judges
are active participants, who find themselves engaged in the truth finding
process, i.e., the direct questioning of witnesses, throughout the entirety

198. CISG, art. 7(1).

199. See Winer, supra note 1, at 13.
200. See HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 171 & n.18. For example, the French Civil Code rule,
which is similar to the parol evidence rule, does not apply to commercial transactions, and Germany does not even have a comparable rule. See id. at 171 n.18.
201. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 210-11 (1954);
Flechtner, supranote 171, at 158-59.
202. See MCCORICK, supranote 201, § 211.
203. See Gerhard Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 135, 135-36 (1972).

204. Id.
at 136.
205. See Max Rheinstein, ComparativeLaw-Its Functions,Methods and Usages, 22 ARK. L.
REV. 415, 422 (1968). In Western Europe, the jury trial is in eclipse: the German jury disappeared
in 1924 and was replaced by a mixed professional, lay person tribunal in 1941; the French jury fell
in 1941; and in Italy, the Fascists eliminated the jury trial in 1931. See Casper & Zeisel, supra note
203, at 135. In Eastern Europe there no longer is a trial by jury. See id. "Only Austria, Norway, a
few jurisdictions in Switzerland, and Belgium have retained the jury." Id. However, the juries in
those countries operate under severe restrictions. See id.
206. See Rheinstein, supra note 205, at 422.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:799

of the case.' While the common-law system created the parol evidence
rule to control juries, civil code countries did not have such a need.2 " To
allow the rule to apply to the CISG mainly for the accommodation of
the United States, would undermine the Convention's goal to achieve a

uniform system of contract law.
The founders of the Convention also sought to achieve the Convention's uniformity goal in Article 7(1) by encouraging "the dissemi-

nation and use of the international case law (jurisprudence)" that will
apply and interpret the language of the Convention.2 0 In developing in-

ternational case law for the promotion of uniformity, United States
courts have to consider that they will have an international and not

merely a national audience when they write opinions involving the
CISG. 2 "° By precluding application of the parol evidence rule, the decision in MCC-Marble Ceramic Center fosters the creation of a cohesive

body of international CISG jurisprudence,2" currently in a state of infancy in the United States. 21 2 MCC-Marble Ceramic Centerproduced an
opinion that rendered a meaningful analysis of Article 8 without seeking
the assistance of a domestic rule of law, such as the parol evidence
rule.2 3 The court thoroughly discussed all three provisions of Article 8.24 As a result, even if courts disagree with the outcome in MCCMarble Ceramic Center,the opinion may at least serve as an exemplary
207. See id. The comprehensive powers of a judge are especially pervasive in the Socialist
governed countries. See id.
208. See supra notes 202, 207 and accompanying text.
209. HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 60 (emphasis omitted); see CISG, art. 7(1).
210. See HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 142-44. In a famous English case, Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd., which involved the Warsaw Convention, the international convention which
governs the liability of air carriers, the House of Lords gave the word "damage" a broader meaning
than understood under English law due to the international setting of the case. See 2 Lloyd's Rep.
209, 217 (1980). However, requiring courts to consider jurisprudence from other nations raises at
least two practical problems: "(1) foreign case law is not readily available ... and (2) even where
it can be retrieved, [foreign case law] is often written in a language unknown to [an interpreting
court]." Ferrari, supra note 31, at 254.
211. See Andreason, supra note 5, at 362-63, 373, 379; see also Dennis J. Rhodes, Comment,
The United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods: Encouraging
the Use of Uniform InternationalLaw, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 387, 388 (1992) (asserting that the
CISG has played an integral role in uniform international law).
212. Because of the paucity of current United States case law that discusses the CISG, courts
that decide to interpret CISG provisions would serve the especially important task of developing
United States CISG case law. See Helen Kaminski Pty. Ltd. v. Marketing Australian Prod., Inc.,
Nos. M-47 (DLC), 96B46519, 97-8072A, 1997 WL 414137, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 1997)
(stating "that there is little to no case law on the CISG in general"); Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich
Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (acknowledging that there is virtually no
case law interpreting the CISG in the United States).
213. See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1386-91.
214. See id.
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approach for United States courts to follow when they must interpret not
only Article 8, but any CISG provision that may apply to their case.215
In contrast, instead of undertaking a thorough analysis of pertinent
CISG provisions, Beijing Metals adopted a common approach many
courts adhere to when confronted with the challenge of interpreting unfamiliar provisions from international agreements. Often when faced
with such a dilemma, courts seek the application of more commonly
known domestic rules for assistance.216 Courts may look to domestic law
when gaps exist in an international body of law.2" 7 However, when the
plain language of a convention calls for a clear approach for action, then
the application of domestic rules should be avoided.2"' To do otherwise
would violate the uniformity concerns of the CISG.
Moreover, the Beijing Metals court did not even explain why or
how the parol evidence rule applied to the CISG.2 9 The court did not
compare and contrast the parol evidence rule to Article 8, or any other
CISG provisions.re Because the court insufficiently addressed the application of the CISG to the facts of the case, Beijing Metals is not as instructive as MCC-Marble Ceramic Center for courts that have to interpret CISG provisions. Therefore, the holding in Beijing Metals does not
foster the development of a uniform system of international jurisprudence.
Applying the parol evidence rule to the CISG would also violate
the "observance of good faith" provision mentioned in Article 7 (1 )*f22
If
the parol evidence rule applied to the CISG, then civil code countries
and other nations that lack such a rule would have a substantial burden
of learning how to apply the rule to international agreements for the sale
of goods. As previously discussed, it is often difficult to determine
215. Prior to the MCC-Marble Ceramic Center decision, a German court used Article 8 to
examine pre-contract negotiations and determined that an agreement existed between the two parties in the case. Unknown parties, 50 543188, LG Hamburg, Unilex D., 1990 (1990, 6(6).
216. See KRrrzER, supranote 172, at 118-19.
217. See id.
218. See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1391. The following observation was
made with regard to resorting to private law to fill gaps in the Convention:
Reference to private international law rules is the least problematic aspect of this provision[, Article 7(2)]. The true danger lies in courts unnecessarily resorting to these
rules. The provision itself requires that before the rules are consulted, the reader must
first find that there is a gap in the text, and then find that the Convention does not provide an answer throuh its underlying principles.
KRrizER, supra note 172, at 118 (quoting Peter Winship, Private InternationalLaw and the U.N.
Sales Convention, 21 CORNELL INT'LL.J. 529 (1988)).
219. See Beijing Metals, 993 F.2d at 1178-87.

220. See id.
221. See CISG, art. 7(1).
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whether parties to an agreement formed an "unintegrated," "partially
integrated," or "completely integrated" document.m Misuse of the

complex parol evidence rule would thus unnecessarily cause transaction
costs to increase in the global economy.za Adding unnecessary costs to
international transactions would not foster the Convention's intent to
promote the observance of good faith in international trade.
Furthermore, if the parol evidence rule were made applicable to the

CISG, nations not familiar with the rule may gain distrust with nations
that wish to apply the rule to the CISG.24 The nations who would be

placed at a legal disadvantage may then have an incentive to seek application of their complex domestic rules, unfamiliar to common-law

countries, to gain their own legal upper-hand.2 Hence, this potential act
of reciprocity by other member nations would create a greater departure
from the CISG's desire to observe good faith in international trade.: 6
222. See supra Part I. Due to the rule's inherent awkwardness, not even the United States,
the common-law country that most regularly applies the rule, has a uniform parol evidence rule as
developed under its case law. See HONNOLD, supra note 187, at 491. Furthermore, England, itself
a common-law country and the place of origin of the parol evidence rule, sought abolishment of its
use, because the rule has been an "embarrassment for the administration of modem transactions."
HONNOLD, supranote 12, at 171.
223. See Peter Winship, Domesticating InternationalCommercial Law: Revising U.C.C. Article2 in Light of the UnitedNations Sales Convention, 37 LOY. L. REV. 43,46 (1991).
224. See HoNrqOLD, supra note 12, at 161.
225. See id.; cf Callaghan, supra note 5, at 183 (explaining that the United States centric
view of trying to solve international trade conflicts by seeking uniform application of United
States commercial laws is no longer tolerated by its trading partners, if it ever was); John Tagliabue, Resisting Those Ugly Americans: Contempt in Francefor U.S. Funds and Investors, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2000, § 3, at 1 (discussing how the recent increase of United States investment in
France as a result of the global economy has lead to increased apprehension of unwanted United
States cultural influence in France). President Reagan noted that "[United States] sellers and buyers cannot expect that foreign trading partners will always agree on the applicability of United
States law. Insistence by both parties on this sensitive point can prolong and jeopardize the making
of... contract[s]." See Schultz, supra note 114, at 1369.
These observations may be especially true today in light of the recent adoption of the
Euro, the new world currency, established by the joint effort of eleven European nations. See
Jonathan Fuerbringer, New Rival Arrives, but Dollar Is Still the World's Champion, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 1999, at C6. The Euro is expected to increase the economic and political bargaining power
of the European nations and rival the United States dollar. See Rinaldo Gianola, Euro, debutto alla
grande:Da Sydney a Tokyo la nuova moneta batte dollaro e yen, LA REPUBBLICA (Italy), Jan. 4,
1999, at 2.
226. See HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 161. Unbeknownst to many individuals, from 1840 to
1914, the world had already experienced a period of globalization that was, in a way, more dramatic than the integration of world markets that has been taking place since 1945. See Trade Before the Tariffs, ECONOMIST, Jan. 8-14, 2000, at 83 (reviewing KEviN O'RoURKE & JEFFREY
WILLIAMSON, GLOBALISATION AND HISTORY: THE EVOLUTION OF A NINETEENTH-CENTURY
ATLANTc ECONOMY (1999)). "Transport costs and trade barriers fell faster, international capital
flows as a share of national output were far larger; and cross-border migration was far greater." Id.
However, countries that did not benefit from the globalization phenomenon soon put an end to its
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Finally, the MCC-Marble Ceramic Center court acted in accordance with the catchall language in Article 7(2): "[q]uestions ...governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be
settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or,
in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable
by virtue of the rules of private international law." 7 The court based its
decision on express provisions of the CISG, namely Articles 8 and 11 m
This would have provided a sufficient analysis under Article 7(2). However, the MCC-Marble Ceramic Center court took an additional step. To
further support the strength of its holding, the court also based its decision on the general principles of the Convention: the promotion of uniformity and good faith in cross-border contracts involving the sale of
goods.2
In contrast, the Beijing Metals court did not render its decision in
accordance with Article 7(2). Instead of first attempting to explain its
reasoning based on express provisions or the general principles of the
Convention, the court reflexively applied private international law, the
United States parol evidence rule.'
The quality of the United States court decisions that need to interpret Article 8 will not be compromised if the parol evidence rule were
excluded from the Convention. If contracting parties wish to use the parol evidence rule to limit the scope of admissible evidence, they can do
so by making express declarations pursuant to the applicable CISG
provisions.'
To avoid parol evidence problems regarding prior agreements,
parties may also add a merger clause to their written contracts. A typical
merger clause includes language which indicates that all of the terms in
a particular contract are intended to be final and complete expressions
of the contracting parties.1 2 The approach that a majority of courts foloccurrence. See id.
227. CISG, art. 7(2).
228. See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1386-90.
229. See id. at 1390.

230. See Beijing Metals, 993 F.2d at 1182-83. When the court argued that the UCC did not
apply to the dispute because the contract at issue resembled a settlement agreement more than a
sale of goods contract, the court had a chance to argue the CISG was also inapplicable to the case.
However, the court declined to do so, and instead decided that the CISG may have also governed
the case. See id. at 1183 n.9.
231. As discussed supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text, Articles 12 and 96 permit parties to deviate from the terms of the CISG and adopt the parol evidence rule. Moreover, the parties
can contract for a specific type of parol evidence rule such as the modem Corbin or classic Williston approach. See Ross & Tranen, supranote 69, at 229.
232. See FARNswoRTH, supra note 45, § 7.3, at 436; see also Ronald A. Brand & Harry M.
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low is to give conclusive effect to merger clauses because they specifically deal with expressing the intention of contracting parties as to their
desired degree of integration. 23' However, the minority view taken by

courts is to deny the conclusive effect of merger clauses.' Some of the
courts that have adopted the minority approach have decided that a
merger clause should only be one of many factors to be considered in
determining the existence of a total integration. 's Other courts that adhere to the minority approach have suggested only merger clauses that
are actually agreed upon by the parties, as opposed to a boilerplate
merger clause, should have conclusive effect. 6 Nevertheless, even if

not conclusive evidence, merger clauses may at least serve as probative
evidence to help an undecided court determine whether parties to an
agreement decided to produce an unintegrated, partially integrated, or
completely integrated document.
Furthermore, courts will not give conclusive effect to a party's evidence that attempts to prove his or her subjective intent.' 7 Just like other
questions of fact, parties will have to prove their subjective intent

through the proper discovery channels."5 Moreover, the United States
Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE") also will serve as a safeguard to
prevent the admission of unreliable or irrelevant extrinsic evidence. 9
The FRE, a body of procedural rules, applies to the CISG, even though
the CISG is an international agreement. A court is always free to use

procedural rules regardless of the substantive source of law, whether it
be national or international, that governs a case.m

Flechtner, Arbitration and ContractFormationin InternationalTrade: FirstInterpretationsof the
U.N. Sales Convention, 12 J.L. & COM. 239, 252 (1993) (discussing the effect of merger clauses
on contracts governed by the CISG).
233. See CALAMARI & PEJI.O,supra note 47, § 3-6, at 156; FARNSWORTH, supra note 45,
§ 7.3, at 436; see also Tapper Chevrolet Co. v. Hansen, 510 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Idaho 1973)
(holding "the integrated character of the parties' written contract is established by its 'merger'
provision").
234. See Sierra Diesel Injection Serv., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 874 F.2d 653, 657 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that the merger clause in a pre-printed form contract did not determine integration
as a matter of law); RESTATEME'T (SEcOND) OF CoNTRAcrs, § 209 cmt. b (stating that a declaration of a merger clause does not have conclusive effect).
235. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supranote 47, § 3.6, at 156.
236. See id.
237. See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d
1384, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998).
238. See id.
239. For example, a party that wished to prove a contract through the aid of extrinsic evidence could not do so in a way that would violate the rule against hearsay. See FED. R. EvaD. 802;
MCC-Marble CeramicCtr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1389.
240. See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1389; note 13 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, to help achieve uniformity in international contract law,
courts can avoid application of the parol evidence rule while simultaneously having the ability to preserve the integrity of written contracts
through other viable and available methods.
D. Academic Commentary in Support of the
MCC-Marble Ceramic Center
ParolEvidenceAnalysis
Most CISG commentators agree that in comparison with the parol
evidence rule, Article 8 provides for a broader examination of evidence
to ascertain the subjective intent of contracting parties."1 As opposed to
the explicit parol evidence rule provisions in the UCC or the Restatement, neither the language in Article 8, nor any other provisions of the

CISG mention any special method for determining the intent of contracting parties. John Honnold, one of the official United States representatives to the Convention, has commented that, "Article 8 does not
directly address the 'parol evidence rule'; references to this and other
technical domestic rules would have cluttered the draft and would have
mystified jurists from legal systems that have no such rule.''US
However, at least two legal scholars, Ronald A. Brand and Harry
M. Flechtner, are of the opinion that the parol evidence rule is consistent with Article 8 with regard to the interpretation of contract lan-

241. See HONNOLD, supra note 12, at 171; KRrr2R, supra note 172, at 125 (noting "the
Convention has no parole evidence rule of the type recited in UCC 2-202"); Andreason, supra
note 5, at 360 ("Since negotiations are a type of evidence the parol evidence rule specifically prohibits, the Convention writers' efforts to include prior negotiations demonstrates their clear desire
to reject the parol evidence rule."); Samuel J.M. Donnelly & Mary Ann Donnelly, Commercial
Law, 49 SYRACUSE L. REv. 271, 303 (1999) ("The Parol Evidence Rule like the Statute of Frauds
is not part of the CISG so the agreement of the parties can be evidenced by oral statements made
prior to or contemporaneously with any writing."); Esslinger, supra note 15, at 84 ("The U.C.C.'s
parol evidence rule is thus effectively revoked for CISG contracts."); Flechtner, supra note 171, at
158; Henry D. Gabriel, The Inapplicabilityof the United Nations Convention on the International
Sale of Goods as a Model for the Revision of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72
TUL. L. REV. 1995, 2007 (1998) ("[T]he CISG also does not have a parol evidence rule."); Murray, supra note 43, at 12 ("We are struck by a new world where there is no consideration, no statute of frauds, and no parol evidence rule, among other differences."); Winship, supra note 223, at
57 (discussing that "Article 8(3) of the Convention rejects domestic rules that bar the fact finder
from considering any evidence other than a written contract document without regard to the parties' intent").
242. See Flechtner, supra note 171, at 157. Compare CISG, art. 8 with U.C.C. § 2-202 (1996).
When the UCC applies to a case, Article 2 explicitly includes a parol evidence rule provision to be
taken into consideration. See U.C.C. § 2-202.
243. HONNOLD, supranote 12, at 170.
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guage.' "According to modem authorities, the parol evidence rule does
not bar evidence that relates to interpreting existing terms of a writing
...." Moreover, "[fjar from invalidating such a rule, CISG Article 8(3) emphasizes the importance of the parties' intent .... "1 However, with regard to proving whether a contract is a partial or complete
integration, Brand and Fletchtner concede the dissimilarities between
Article 8 and the parol evidence rule. 7 Moreover, with regard to determining the subjective intent of contracting parties, both commentators also admit that "the Convention [clearly] does not adopt the somewhat bizarre and abstruse methods for determining intent associated
with the parol evidence rule."" s
Another commentator, David H. Moore, has argued that in applying the modem form of the parol evidence rule to an agreement, a judge
also gives "due consideration" to all the relevant circumstances of the
case.29 According to Moore, the modem form of the parol evidence rule
"requires the court to determine whether a writing is completely or partially integrated by looking to the intent of the parties, intent that may
be indicated 'by any relevant evidence"' including prior negotiations."
Likewise, Moore mentions that besides examining prior negotiations to
determine whether the parties intended a partial or complete integration,
courts will look to prior negotiations to help interpret the language used
in a contract.2'
Contrary to Moore's analysis, even under the modem parol evidence rule, once a judge determines that a writing is an integration,
whether partial or complete, terms that contradict the writing are not
admissible.f 2 Furthermore, upon a finding of a complete integration,
courts will even prohibit admitting terms that are consistent with and
supplement the writing.23 On the other hand, Article 8(3) will let a court
admit evidence of prior oral or written agreements that are inconsistent
with the contract to prove the subjective intent of the parties. The broad
244. See Brand & Flechtner, supra note 232, at 251-52.
245. Id.at 251.
246. Id.

247. See id.
248. Id.
249. See David H. Moore, The Parol Evidence Rule and the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Justifying Beijing Metals & Minerals Im-

port/Export Corp. v. American Business Center, Inc., 1995 BYU L. REv. 1347, 1361 (1995).
250. Id.
251. See id. at 1357 n.45; supra Part U.A.2.
252. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrS § 209 cmt. a

(1981).
253. See supra Part II.B.I.
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sweeping "due consideration" language of Article 8(3) permits the admissibility of evidence without considering a special set of exclusionary
evidentiary rules.' Thus, the CISG goes further than the parol evidence
rule to obtain the subjective intent of the parties by admitting a wider
range of evidence of prior negotiations.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the parol evidence rule may be consistent with Article 8
in some circumstances, Article 8 takes a more liberal approach in permitting extrinsic evidence. Article 8 is to be so liberally construed that
even if a document were found to be a complete integration, Article 8
would still permit the admission of evidence of prior agreements to
contradict the terms of the contract. 5 Article 8 allows for such admission because obtaining the subjective intent of the contracting parties is
crucial to the CISG. Furthermore, having an abstract and difficult rule,
such as the parol evidence rule, runs contrary to the Convention's goals
of seeking to establish uniformity and simplicity in the law for the international sale of goods. Therefore, courts in the United States should
follow the Eleventh Circuit Court's approach in precluding the application of the parol evidence rule to contracts governed by the Convention.
In addition, courts in other CISG member nations should look to the cogent MCC Marble-Ceramic Center analysis as a model when they are
confronted with interpreting not only Article 8 but other CISG provisions as well.
PeterJ. Calleo*

254. See Flechtner, supranote 171, at 157 n.13.
255. See supraPart IV.A.
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